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What Is A Tragedy of the Commons?
Overfishing and the Campaign Spending Problem
Shi-Ling Hsu

I.

Introduction

Over the thirty-seven years since its publication, Garden
Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons"1 has clearly become one of the
most influential writings of all time. The tragedy of the commons is
one of those rare scholarly ideas that has had an enormous impact in
academia2 and is also commonly used outside of academia.3 In legal
scholarship, the tragedy of the commons has been used to characterize
a scarcity of intellectual property rights,4 telemarketing,5 asbestos
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1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
2. A Westlaw search on November 22, 2004, yielded 919 hits for "'The
Tragedy of the Commons,' /s Hardin". A search of the social sciences citation index
on the same day produced 2,890 hits. Among the hundreds of books treating the
concept in depth are: ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990); CAROL
M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION (1996); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); COMMONS
WITHOUT TRAGEDY: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM OVERPOPULATION
(Robert V. Andelson, ed., 1991).
3. A Google search on January 17, 2005 for "tragedy of the commons" yielded
over 468,000 matches. A January 17, 2005 Westlaw search of the U.S.
Congressional Testimony database yielded 32 hits, while a search of the
Congressional Record database turned up ten hits, including a reference by Sen.
Larry Craig (R-ID) arguing that political pork-barrelling was a political tragedy of
the commons (136 Cong.Rec. H4389-0, June 20, 1990), and Sen. Charles Grassley
(R
- IA) arguing pollution is a tragedy of the commons, and should be alleviated by
federal subsidies for production of corn-based fuels (137 Cong. Rec. S6024-01, May
16, 1991).
4. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141-43, citing William M. Landes and Richard
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 475 (2003).
5. Ian Ayres and Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77,
87-93 (2003).
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over-litigation,6 neglect of Presidential papers,7 overcrowding of the
radio spectrum,8 overcrowding of the wireless telecommunications
spectrum,9 sidewalk vending,10 greenhouse gas emissions,11 water
pollution,12 underground water overdrafting,13 and of course, the
classic environmental commons problem, overfishing.14 But this
embarrassment of citation riches highlights the fact that although we
invoke it often, we do not know exactly what constitutes a tragedy of
the commons.
Defining a tragedy of the commons is not just an academic
exercise. In an ideological policy battle between interventionists and
libertarians, those that argue for and against governmental
intervention, a true tragedy of the commons situation presents a
potentially decisive argument in favor of intervention. In a true
tragedy of the commons, resource users impose mutual externalities
upon each other, creating a paternalistic justification for intervention.
Of course, in over-exploiting a resource, resource users may also
impose externalities upon a larger group that has some stake in the
resource, such as the general public might have in clean air or water.
This externality alone may be sufficient justification for intervening.
But as I define it in this Article, a tragedy of the commons specifically
involves a situation in which the resource users are detracting from
their own ability to continue to exploit the resource. For those trapped
in the tragedy, it is a self-defeating pathology that flies in the face of
6. Francis E. Mcgovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1721, 1721-22 (2002).
7. Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: the
Convergence and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of
Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651 (2003).
8. Karl Manheim and Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain
Name Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 416 (2003).
9. Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 936 (2004).
10. Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMP.
L. REV. 1 (2004).
11. Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale? Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51
AM. U. L. REV. 1135, 1145 (2002); Laura Kosloff and Mark Trexler, State Climate
Change Initiatives: Think Locally, Act Globally, 18-WTR NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
46, 46 (2004).
12. Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 EVNTL. L. 1, 5 (2003).
13. David J. Hayes, Privatization and Control of U.S. Water Supplies, 18 FALL
NAT. RESOURCES & EVNT. 19 (2003).
14. Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust As An
Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3, 3 (2004).
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economic reason, and yet, as I will demonstrate in this Article, is
perfectly consistent with economic assumptions of rationality. The
need to save the resource users from themselves provides, independent
of the need to internalize other large-group externalities, a particularly
compelling case for governmental intervention. In true tragedies of the
commons, Pareto Superior15 policy moves are possible in ways that
are generally not feasible in other putative tragedies of the commons,
in which this self-destructiveness is absent. I use the definition set
forth in this Article to analyze a problem that has not been previously
recognized as a tragedy of the commons – the problem of everincreasing political campaign expenditures.
In part II of this Article, I set out my definition of a tragedy of
the commons, using the overfishing problem and other examples to
illustrate what is unique about this class of problems. In so doing, I
distinguish it from the broader set of large-group externality problems
that are mischaracterized as tragedies of the commons problems, such
as air and water pollution. In part III of this Article I use the
overfishing problem to illustrate the dynamics of tragedies of the
commons, showing how resource degradation over time impacts
resource users. In part IV of this Article I apply this analysis to the
problem of political campaign spending, showing how the problem is
similar to the problem of overfishing, and showing how the current
campaign spending debate, framed as freedom versus equality, is
misguided. In part V of this Article, I address the question of why
those trapped in a tragedy of the commons are not more eager to
address their joint overexploitation problem. Finally, in part VI, I
discuss solutions to tragedies of the commons, in particular those for
the campaign spending problem.
II.

The Tragedy of the Commons
A.

Hardin's True Tragedy

Hardin's tragedy of the commons has proven to be a worthy
foil to Adam Smith's much older parable of the "invisible hand."16

15. A Pareto Superior policy is one in which at least one member of society is
made better off, and none are made worse off. ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D.
WHINSTON, AND JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 313 (1995).
16. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS vii-ix, 7-32 (George Stigler, ed., Crofts Classics 1957). Stigler
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Hardin's story of resource overexploitation poses a striking contrast to
Smith's narrative illustrating the coincidence of self-interest and
collective interest. Whereas Smith's lesson is that individuals acting in
their self-interest will act to increase collective wealth,17 Hardin's
lesson is that individuals acting in their self-interest will ruin
collective wealth.18 Consciously or not, all varieties of public policy
are debated in ways that draw heavily upon at least one of these two
powerful concepts. Indeed, these two competing ideas, based upon
antithetical conceptions of the ability of people to order their own
affairs, often serve as the underlying bases of arguments for and
against governmental intervention. Hardin and Smith serve, in this
policy realm, as the ideological beacons of opposing viewpoints of the
role of government.
Whereas the implication of Smith's narrative is quite clear –
government should intervene as little as possible – the implications of
Hardin's tragedy are not. Several different forms of policy
prescriptions could be proposed to solve the "commons" problem.19 In
his article, Hardin called for "mutual coercion, mutually agreed
upon."20 But what does this mean? In the stylized examples provided
by Hardin, a variety of policy responses might be appropriate. To
address the overpopulation problem,21 some sort of a taxation scheme
might be the most palatable, or simply a termination of some social
programs that Hardin would consider subsidies for having more
characterizes Smith's concept as an "identity of interest" between self- and collective
interests.
17. Id. at vii-ix. Stigler characterizes Smith's concept as an "identity of interest"
between self- and collective interests. Smith's treatment of the division of labor, in
which self-interested individuals agree to divide up productive tasks and increase
overall production, serves as one example of how self-interest can help produce
increases in collective wealth. Id., at 7-32.
18. Hardin details numerous examples of what he thinks of as a tragedy of the
commons, but most telling is his ultimate rationale for intervention – "mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon." Supra, note 1, at 1246.
19. Scholars have long noted that Hardin's "commons" problem is more
powerfully applied in an "open access" setting, where no ownership rights exist at
all, as distinguished from a common-pool resource. Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads,
and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 106 (2003); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of
Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades, and Ecosystems. 83
MINN. L. REV. 129, 144 (1998); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for
Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 816 (2003).
20. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1245.
21. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1243.
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children.22 To address resource over-exploitation problems such as the
overgrazing problem posed by Hardin,23 privatization of the resource
may be called for.24 To address the problem of pollution,25 some form
of pollution control regulation may be called for. Hardin's message
was that something needs to be done, but he did not seem to
distinguish between a governmental solution and a privatization
solution, or any range of options in between.
I suggest that Hardin's greatest contribution, the core insight of
his article, is the identification of a class of problems in which there is
a need to protect resource users from themselves, and to protect their
continued access to the resource by limiting access. This is the key to
what scholars find most anomalous about the tragedy of the commons:
that protecting resource users requires constraining their liberty in
some way. This is necessary because, despite the irrationality of
embarking upon the tragic course of over-exploitation, people persist
in doing so. If a tragic player could take a long-term view of resource
exploitation, or find a way to cooperate with fellow resource users –
hardly heroic things to expect26 – the tragedy could be avoided. Yet
tragedies persist, particularly in environmental settings.27 This refusal
of resource users to recognize their enlightened self-interest, as well, is
one of those aspects of the tragedy that scholars find so compelling.
This can be distinguished from the broader class of large-group
externality problems in which resource users impose externalities upon
a larger population, without necessarily harming themselves in the
process. The confusion exists because in both types of problems, the
overexploitation pertains to jointly-owned or unowned resources.
These property regimes serve as the root cause of overexploitation.
But Hardin's prescription of "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon,"
seems oriented towards solving problems within the resource user
group, and not necessarily (but often) alleviating externalities imposed
upon those outside of the user group.
22. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1246.
23. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1244.
24. Ostrom certainly believed that this is what Demsetz called for in his
seminal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 13 (1967),
OSTROM, supra, note 2, at 12-13.
25. Hardin, supra, note 1, at 1245.
26. Ostrom's famous book pertains to the conditions under which cooperative
arrangements, formal and informal, can solve common-pool resource problems.
27. Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. LAW 241 (2000).
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What is a "true" tragedy of the commons? I suggest that a truly
tragic resource overexploitation, or a true tragedy of the commons,
contains all of the following elements:
(1) Mutual, uninternalized externalities. A tragedy of the
commons involves, if not perfectly symmetrical situations among
identical players, at least a mutuality of externalities. The mutuality of
externality places parties in mirroring situations in which every tragic
player knows that attempts at cooperative behavior will be met with
cheating, and that every player knows that every player knows this.
Knowing that if one doesn't cheat, others will, creates irresistible
incentives to cheat.
(2) Group payoffs that are less in uncooperative outcomes than
they are in cooperative ones. Professor Lee Ann Fennell has
distinguished the tragedy of the commons from mere distributive
questions. If uncooperative behavior merely led to a wealth transfer,
then there is not necessarily any efficiency loss suffered from the
societal point of view.28
(3) A resource that is rivalrous in consumption. While
situations involving nonrival goods may also produce incentives for
uncooperative behavior, rivalrous consumption among those in a
competitive environment creates particularly strong incentives to
cheat. The understanding that consumption by others detracts from
one's own consumption, coupled with the mutuality of externalities
and the knowledge that this will likely lead to cheating by others, is
what gives rise to the inevitability of uncooperative behavior.
A game-theoretic illustration may be helpful to demonstrate the
logic of tragic behavior, and an economic explanation of why the
tragedy can be so persistent. Consider a game involving two
fishermen, A and B, that will last for 100 time periods. The fishery is
assumed to have a capacity to sustainably yield 100 fish caught per
period. If in any period, the total fish caught by A and B exceeds 100,
the stock will be depleted and the capacity will fall to 99 for the
following period and for all periods thereafter. Thus, if A and B could
agree, they could sustainably harvest 100 fish per period for the entire
100 periods. As a baseline, assume that A and B would evenly split the
100 fish each period, and harvest 50 each. In any period, A or B could
"cheat" and fish harder to catch an extra fish, or could "abstain," and
maintain a current level and effort of fishing. It is further assumed that
28. Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907,
919-922 (2004).
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the effort from fishing is of negligible cost to these fishermen. The
gain of catching extra fish is of paramount consideration.
If, in time period one, T1, A abstains from cheating and B
decides to cheat, B will gain an extra fish for T1. A will have harvested
50 fish and B 51 fish, yielding 101 fish in T1 but knocking the harvest
capacity down to 99 for T2 and all periods thereafter. Assuming B
maintains the higher fishing effort for the remainder of the game, it is
reasonable to assume that in future time periods, A and B will divide
the 99 fish by harvesting, respectively, 49 and 50 fish. The net for the
entire game would thus be that B will have gained one fish, and A, by
losing out on a fish for each of the rest of the 99 periods, will have lost
99 fish, net of her
Figure 1
baseline of 50 fish
per year. If A does
not retaliate by
abstain
abstain
cheating but rather
A
{ 0, 0 }
B
abstains, the game
can be represented
cheat
by Figure 1, and the
payoffs shown in
abstain
A
{ -99, +1 }
Table 1.

T
1
2
3-100

Table 1
A
50
49
49

B
51
50
50

It is reasonable to assume, however, that A would retaliate. In
fact it would be perfectly rational for A to do so. If A chose, in T2, to
cheat by fishing a little harder as well, she would also net an extra fish
– 50 instead of 49, and by both of them catching a total of 100 fish in
T2, in an environment in which the yield capacity is 99, A would play
her part in knocking the capacity in T3 and subsequent time periods
down to 98. In T3 and thereafter, assuming that A and B fish equally
hard, it is reasonable to assume that they would split the catch at 49
apiece. This assumes B abstains from further cheating. This outcome
is shown in Figure 2 and the payoffs in Table 2. A's payoff would be
less by one fish for the remaining 98 periods, resulting in a net payoff
of -98, relative to her baseline of 50 fish per year; B's payoff would
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also reflect this reduced payoff, but B would have benefited by
cheating early and catching an extra fish in T1, yielding a net payoff of
-97. Although A has embarked upon the path to mutually tragic
overexploitation, A is better off cheating as compared to the "abstain"
strategy. By catching an extra fish in T2, A at least got an extra fish in
T2, making her payoff less negative, -98 instead of -99. If B chooses to
abstain from further
cheating, B will,
despite her elevated
Figure 2
effort, also catch
one less fish for the
abstain
abstain
A
rest of the 98
{ 0, 0 }
B
periods.
cheat

Table 2
T
A
50
1
50
2
49
3-100

A

B
51
50
49

abstain

{ -99, +1 }

cheat
B

abstain

{ -98, -97 }

The game is likely to descend further, however. At time T3, B
may not abstain and may well decide that she is not ready to settle for
harvesting only 49 fish per year. The same calculus applies at T3 as it
did at T1: B can gain an extra fish by fishing a little harder still,
catching 50 fish in T3, and even if the yield capacity is knocked further
down to 97, by virtue of A and B catching a total of 99 fish in an
environment in which the capacity is 98, B will nevertheless realize a
temporary, one-period gain of a fish. For the remainder of the game, B
will be fishing harder still just to catch 49 fish per year. Because B is
fishing harder than A, it is reasonable to assume that A and B will split
the catch at 48 and 49 fish, respectively. Thus, B will be working even
harder to catch even fewer fish, catching 49 for the remainder of the
game for a game-total net of -96 (a loss of a fish for the remainder of
the 97 periods, more the extra fish caught in T1). But this is a better
outcome than the final outcome in Figure 2, in which her net was -97.
A, in the meantime, will suffer a loss of two fish every year for years 4
through 100, and loss of one fish in T3, for a game-total of -195 below
the baseline of 50 per year.
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What next? At T4, A may decide to fish still harder as well.
While A realizes that this is ultimately a fool's errand, A realizes that
she can at least snare an extra fish for one year by fishing harder. A
realizes that the yield capacity will be knocked down to 96, a yield
which will be split by A and B at 48 fish apiece, given their equally
hard fishing efforts (and assuming B abstains from further cheating).
But A was going to settle for 48 fish per year anyway, so she reasons
that she might as
Figure 3
well get the extra
fish this year. A had
already lost a fish in
abstain
abstain
A
{ 0, 0 }
B
T3 and was going
lose 2 fish per year
cheat
for at least the last 96
years, and by snaring
abstain
A
{ -99, +1 }
an extra fish in T4, A at least
reduces her loss down from 195
to 194. As in previous cases, the
cheat
externality imposed upon B is
abstain
huge. The outcome is shown in
{ -98, -97 }
B
Figure 3, and the resulting catches
are shown in Table 3.
cheat
Table 3
T
A
50
1
50
2
49
3
49
4
48
5-100

A

B
51
50
50
49
48

abstain

{ -195, -96 }

cheat
B

abstain

{ -194, -192 }

Several interesting things are worth noting about Figure 3.
First, while the miniscule private gains are swamped by the huge
social losses, from an individual's point of view, it remains rational to
pursue the tragic path. At each decision node, it pays, though slightly
to cheat rather than abstain. The externality remains uninternalized.
Second, A's reward for abstaining in T1 was to suffer an inferior
payoff to B in every time period. Thus, there is not only no incentive
to ever abstain, but there is a compelling incentive to cheat, and cheat
first. The compelling incentive to cheat is not simply the miniscule
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gain of one fish in one time period, but the realization that abstention
will be met with cheating. Herein lies the inevitability of the tragedy:
the incentives to cheat are irresistible. They are irresistible because of
the symmetrical nature of the externalities, and the mutual realizations
that any abstention will be punished, and the realization that the other
player understands that her abstention will be punished. Moreover,
even if some sort of regulatory regime were put in place to try and
police cheating, if the regime does not address the incentive to cheat,
enforcement is likely to be problematic.29
One might object that the players in the above game might also
agree to underharvest for a year or two, just to allow the fish stock to
build back up. By the same reasoning as that illustrated in the game,
the gains from cooperation might swamp those of adopting a cheating
strategy. Even then, however, the incentives to cheat are present, and
as a formal economic matter what makes tragedies of the common
truly, inevitably tragic are those compelling incentives to cheat, which
all but ensure the predominance of non-cooperative strategies.
Exceptions exist, of course. Professor Elinor Ostrom's seminal
work on cooperative arrangements identified a number of sustainablyharvested common-pool resources, sometimes managed and exploited
by fairly large groups.30 However, the conditions that must exist
before such large groups can come together in a cooperative
arrangement are unique.31 The failures remain the rule, and the
successes the exception.32
There is the possible objection that the assumption in the
illustrative game that fishing effort is negligible compared with the
harvesting gains is, at a certain point, unrealistic. As fishing effort
increases, the cost of effort is likely to increase, and the benefits likely
to decrease due to diminishing returns. At some point, it becomes
unprofitable to overexploit, or to exploit at all, thereby putting an end
to the cycle of overexploitation. This objection does not, however,
29. For example, fisheries regulation must always address enforcement issues
due to the atomistic nature of the fishing industry. Many ingenious regulatory
schemes have failed for lack of ability to enforce the restrictions. SUZANNE
IUDICELLO, FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING 26,
38, 133 (1999).
30. Supra, note 2.
31. Ostrom analyzes eight similarities among those common-pool resources
that have been managed and harvested sustainably, despite the lack of property
ownership. Ostrom, supra, note 2, at 88-102.
32. Thompson, supra, note 27 at 242.
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detract from the generality of this game. The level of harvesting at
which profitability disappears completely is apt to be at a level of
harvesting that is sub-optimally high.
To illustrate this last point, consider the example of a fishery,
shown in Figure 4, in which the marginal benefits and average benefits
of exploitation decrease as harvesting level increases. We can assume
constant marginal and average costs without loss of generality. The
optimal harvesting point is level qo, at which marginal benefits equal
marginal costs. However, as long as there are no entry barriers – as
there would be if there were private ownership of the fishery or some
entry restrictions – capital will enter as long as there are non-zero rents
to be had, and will dissipate total (industry-wide) rents by increasing
overall harvesting. One inefficiently high level of harvesting might be
q1, at which marginal benefits have sunk below marginal costs. But at
q1 rents still exist in the form of rectangle abcd, inducing more capital
to enter. Economic models of overfishing have demonstrated that
capital will continue to enter and overharvesting will continue to
increase until a stopping point is reached, well beyond the optimum
harvest level. At this point of "rent dissipation," qrd in the graph,
marginal benefits are well below marginal costs, but average costs are
just equal to marginal costs.33 Rents are zero. Herein lies the tragedy
of the overfishing commons – fishermen literally fish themselves into
poverty.34

33. H, Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource,
62 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 124, 130-132 (1954).
34. Id.
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AP
MP
a

b

d

c

q0

MC=AC

q1
qrd
Level of fishing effort

One possible regulatory strategy would thus be to do nothing –
give up on solving the tragedy of the commons, and allow the situation
to deteriorate to the point of rent dissipation. Such a course would in
effect be a determination that rent dissipation is a lesser evil than an
inappropriate regulatory response. At the point of rent dissipation, at
least, the fish will get a break. This may be a plausible approach for
some tragedy of the commons problems. For problems that truly are
intractable, for which any regulatory response or property rights
solution would be truly abhorrent or unworkable, this may be the
answer. Or, it could be that the plundered resource is a resilient one, so
that any respite from overexploitation will allow it to quickly bounce
back to healthy levels. Or, as in the case of some fisheries, it may be
that the capital used in exploiting a stock is a fluid one that exits the
industry easily, avoiding the danger that the capital will get locked into
the resource and compelled irreparably overexploit it.35
35. Paterson and Wilen showed that where the exploited resource is resilient –
that it bounces back from depletion quickly – the danger of irreversible overexploitation is low. Donald G. Paterson and James Wilen, Depletion and Diplomacy:
the North Pacific Seal Hunt, 1886-1910, 2 RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 81,
121-127 (1977). Also, where capital exits and enters the fishery quickly and easily,
there is less danger that capital will have to rely solely on the fishery for income.
Once the stock is depleted enough to render exploitation unprofitable, the fishermen
will exit the fishery, concentrate on another, more profitable species, and return only
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However, for many, if not most tragedy of the commons
problems, such a let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may approach seems
inadequate. The problem is that irreparable harm may have already
occurred at the rent dissipation level. In the fishing example, it is
possible that rent dissipation may not occur until the fish stock has
crashed to the point that it is driven to extinction or will never recover.
Also, the economic harm to the resource users is usually not our only
concern. Resource overexploitation usually imposes externalities upon
the rest of the world. Loss of a fish species will invariably upset
ecological balances in ways that are impossible to predict.
Clearly, this purely economic story is not the complete
explanation for the prevalence and persistence of tragedies. There exist
psychological phenomena that pose obstacles to solving tragedies of
the commons,36 that are imperfectly modeled (if at all) by formal
economic models. However, the tragedy of the commons is largely an
economic story, and this account is the more detailed economic
account of why the tragedy persists.
B.

Distinguished From Other Large-Group Externality
Problems

What I define in this Article as a "true" tragedy of the
commons can be distinguished from other large-group externality
problems involving jointly-owned or unowned resources. There are
two important differences: (1) a tragedy of the commons involves an
externality imposed by resource users that they impose upon each
other by damaging their own ability to exploit the resource, and (2) the
exploited resource is rivalrous in consumption.
A tragedy of the commons does not preclude, of course, the
imposition of externalities on those outside the group. Fish consumers,
ichthyologists, conservationists, and those otherwise intrinsically
interested in preserving fish stocks would suffer negative externalities
at the hands of the tragic fishermen even as the latter destroy their own
livelihood. But the existence of an externality imposed by resource
users on those outside the group is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for a tragedy of the commons. A tragedy of the commons
when the stock is healthy enough to exploit profitably again. Id., at 121-27. This is
not to say that this exploitive pattern is ideal, only that the dangers of irreparable
harm are less in some circumstances than others.
36. Thompson, supra, note 27, and Section VI. infra.
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can be self-contained, with resource users destroying themselves
without harming anyone outside of the group. As well, unless resource
users are harming themselves by overexploitation, the imposition of an
externality upon those outside the group does not, by my definition,
make the situation a tragedy of the commons.
Consider the example of air pollution. Hardin himself thought
this to be an example of a tragedy of the commons, only it involves the
excessive putting in of something – pollution – rather than the
excessive taking out of a scarce resource.37 There is a similarity in that
the calculus facing the individual – the polluter enjoys the full benefit
of polluting, just as the herdsman enjoys the full benefit of grazing an
additional animal, while the costs are shared among many.38 However,
whereas there is a paternalistic justification for intervention in a
tragedy of the commons, intervention in the more general case must be
justified on the grounds of internalizing externalities to others.
It is true that air polluters would benefit from pollution
regulation in an indirect way, as members of the air-breathing public.
Is the difference, then, between a tragedy of the commons and other
large-group externality problems merely a matter of degree? The
answer is no, because in a tragedy of the commons, regulation confers
very different benefits upon the resource users than upon the larger
group. In the overfishing case, regulation that saves fish stocks confers
upon the general public a continued supply of fish, ecological integrity
by preserving a possibly important part of the aquatic ecosystem, and
perhaps the psychic value of knowing that we have not decimated yet
another species out of carelessness. Like the rest of the world,
fishermen enjoy these benefits. But what is also conferred upon the
fishermen is a continued ability to fish and practice their livelihood.
This is a benefit that is very different from those consumption and
conservation benefits that are enjoyed by the diffuse public, and the
existence of this additional benefit is what characterizes a tragedy of
the commons. By contrast, regulation that reduces air pollution yields
similar benefits to air polluters and air breathers alike. There is no
argument that limiting air pollution helps air polluters in any way in
their polluting efforts, or preserves their ability to pollute in the future.
Thus, while all large-group externality problems will realize benefits
from regulation that inure to the large group (typically the general
public), in a tragedy of the commons resource users will receive the
37. Supra, note 1, at 1245.
38. Supra, note 1, at 1244.
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additional benefit of being saved from their own improvidence and the
ability to carry on the future with their resource exploitation.
Intervention may be entirely warranted, perhaps even
compelling, for a variety of large-group externality problems such as
air and water pollution.39 But the nature of the justification for such
large-group externality problems is apt to be different than it is for
tragedies of the commons. The justification for arresting other largegroup externality problems may be varied and complicated, and may
involve difficult ethical questions regarding tradeoffs between
economic growth and ecological or human health. A cost-benefit
analysis may or may not be appropriate for making such decisions. But
the case for arresting tragedies of the commons is apt to include one
additional, simple and compelling justification: save the resource users
from themselves. This is also not to say that successful regulation is
always possible or feasible. But the case for trying is stronger.
The second distinguishing feature of a tragedy of the commons
is that the resource being overexploited is rivalrous in consumption.
Rivalrous consumption is what gives urgency to the race to exploit,
and creates compelling incentives to cheat. This incentive is illustrated
by the game-theoretic model of the tragedy, in which A's abstinence,
even temporary, resulted in her having an inferior payoff to B in every
time period. With a non-rival resource problem such as air pollution,
the capacity to pollute is not hindered by the very fact of their
pollution. However harmful air pollution has been for public health,
polluting has not bumped up against any absolute physical limits that
would prevent polluters from continuing to pollute. Polluters thus do
not face the same compelling incentives to pollute.40 To be sure, there
are competitive forces that compel polluters to pollute, but there is no

39. A cost benefit analysis of the Clean Air Act, for example, showed
compliance costs of over $600 billion, but environmental benefits in excess of $22
trillion. Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA], Office of Air and
Radiation, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 ES-8 (Oct.
1997).
40. Lessig argues that for nonrivalrous goods, there is no possibility of a
"tragedy of the commons," since nonrivalry means that availability for users does not
diminish with increased consumption. Lessig, note 2, at 22-23. Lessig is arguing for
leaving in the commons some intellectual property because of the positive network
effects of such knowledge. However, the point of the tragedy of the commons
metaphor, as applied to pollution problems, is that there are negative externalities
associated with pollution, that do not diminish pollution opportunities, but should
nevertheless be curtailed.
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race to spew out the pollution before someone else has the
opportunity.
C.

Other Examples of Tragedies of the Commons

The tragedy of the commons is usually considered a story
about property and property rights. For example, one prescription for
fixing the tragedy is the establishment of private property rights, so
that there is no externality. Like property law itself, the tragedy of the
commons has insinuated itself into a variety of problems not involving
real property, or any physical res. While Smith and Merrill caution us
against extending property law too far into the non-physical realm and
forgetting the in rem nature of property law,41 it is still very much
worth remembering the lessons that property problems teach us for
purposes of solving a variety of public policy problems.
1.

Traffic Congestion

Among students who have taken my environmental law
courses in both Canada and the U.S., the most consistently identifiable
tragedy of the commons problem is that of traffic congestion. Traffic
congestion provides an excellent pedagogical device for teaching the
tragedy of the commons. Because drivers all face the same decision
environment, the problem of traffic illustrates the role of mutuality in
explaining the persistence of an externality. Also, the traffic problem
showcases the importance of transaction costs in frustrating noncoercive solutions, in that negotiations among commuters are
impossible. Finally, traffic congestion illustrates the effects of
overutilization of a resource that is rivalrous in consumption: roads.
Like other tragedies of the commons, resource users inflict losses upon
themselves as a group in terms of the ability to use the resource, by
lengthening commute times and degrading the transportation resource.
Externalities are also imposed upon non-users, the air-breathing
public, in the form of pollution. But this is a separate and distinct
large-group externality, that is not itself the tragedy of the commons.
The politically safest justification for intervention is to save
commuting drivers and protect their commuting experiences.
Significantly, the hue and cry for solving traffic problems comes more
41. Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill, Whatever Happened to Property in Law
and Economics? 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
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typically from frustrated drivers than those who worry about the air
pollution externality being imposed upon the general public.42
The traditional engineering solution to traffic congestion has
been to expand roadway capacity. As most traffic engineers now
understand, this can be a self-defeating strategy, as expanding
roadway capacity has the effect of reducing transportation costs so that
new demands are created by new users – new residential development,
for example, that springs up specifically because of the new roadway
capacity.43 This is an example of the kind of solution that ignores the
second-order effects, those that are easily seen once one appreciates
the nature of the externality. More thoughtful approaches have thus
been oriented towards internalizing the congestion externality, and
trying to alter the incentives to participate in the tragedy. This has
been attempted by trying to draw people out of the pool of resource
users, by imposing a time-of-day-sensitive congestion tax44 and by
subsidizing alternative transportation modes such as transit and
bicycling.45 Or, incentives may be provided to induce people to at least
make utilization of the roads more efficient, by encouraging
carpooling through the creation of high-occupancy vehicle lanes.46
While not exactly like the overfishing problem, traffic congestion
creates the same dynamics.47
42. See, e.g., Chip Jones, Virginia Governor's Funding Initiative Sparks New
Hopes for Rail, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, December 24, 2004, at 7 (noting that a
rail expansion plan in Northern Virginia promised to bring relief to "angry
commuters tired of getting stuck in traffic."); Duane Stanford, Toll Lanes Urged to
Ease Gridlock, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, November 30, 2004 at A1
("Frustrated communters would be able to buy their way out of traffic jams or ride
trainlike express buses if the newest proposal to attack long commutes on Interstates
75 and 575 through Cobb and Cherokee counties is enacted"); Stephen Ginsburg, Va.
To Build Private Toll Lanes, WASHINGTON POST, August 27, 2004 at A1 ("Officials
have embraced the concept as a way to give motorists relief from chronic tie-ups").
43. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social
Norms: Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L. J. 1231, 1243-49
(2000).
44. Id., at 1243-47.
45. Id., at 1238; Oliver A. Pollard, Smart Growth: the Promise, Politics, and
Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 Va. Envtl. L. J.
247, 260 (2000).
46. Id., at 1238-41.
47. The traffic problem is somewhat different from the overfishing problem in
that there are no "stock" effects, in which excessive current consumption somehow
harms the potential for future consumption. But the rivalrous nature of the resource
still creates compelling incentives to cheat. Indeed, no serious attempt is ever made
to induce people to not drive so as to make others' commutes more expedient.
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2.

Performance-enhancing Substances in Sports

Seemingly continuous revelations of the use of performanceenhancing drugs being used by professional athletes have exacted a
toll on the image of the affected sports. Baseball star Barry Bonds
recently demurred suspiciously to inquiries regarding his knowledge
about substances that his trainer provided him that are now thought to
have been steroids.48 Bonds claims to have believed that he was
receiving flaxseed oil from his trainer, who remains under federal
indictment for his connection with an alleged trafficker of illegal
performance-enhancing drugs.49 Bonds has hit 703 career home runs,
and is within reach of Hank Aaron's Major League record of 755 home
runs, an approach that would normally be cause for celebration.50 But
Bonds, never a popular star to begin with, has seen his image further
tarnished by this scandal, and it seems likely that his remarkable
accomplishments will be overshadowed by his use of steroids.51
There are those athletes that would not trade places with
Bonds, knowing that the use of such substances will exact a health toll
in the long run. Anabolic steroids have been linked to a variety of
health disorders, such as infertility, baldness, distorted genitalia, and a
heightened danger of drug dependence.52 And yet, because of the
exorbitant payoffs of baseball success, there are those that choose to
make that tradeoff.53 The late baseball star Ken Caminiti, who in a

48. Dave Anderson, Bonds' Excuse Has the Scent of Snake Oil, Not Arthritis
Balm, N.Y. TIMES, December 7, 2004 at D1; Dave Anderson, 2004: Steroids; Bonds
and Giambi Testify and Change the Playing Field, N.Y. TIMES, December 26, 2004
at 87.
49. Id.
50. Donna Liquori, At a Shrine to Baseball, Steroid Inquiry Inspires Shame,
N.Y. TIMES, December 5, 2004, at 811.
51. Art Thiel, Baseball Immortality Bruised by Injuries, Seattle PostIntelligencer, February 10, 2005 at D1 (The Giants' star has 703 home runs, but the
steroids scandal has baseball in a magnum twist about how to salute the pending
surrender of its most hallowed individual record by a guy who looks more and more
like a sports crook").
52. Mayo Clinic, Steroids and sports: a Dangerous Mix? Available online at
MayoClinic.com, at http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?objectid=7C05F9A5A456-4391-AE4457129F6337A1 (last visited February 17, 2005).
53. In effectively admitting steroid use, Bonds joins other baseball sluggers
such as the late Ken Caminiti, Gary Sheffield, Jason Giambi, and Jose Canseco. Id.;
Stefan Fatsis, History Slowed Baseball's Move to Curb Steroids, WALL ST. J.,
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2002 interview, was one of the first baseball players to admit to using
steroids, remained unapologetic for using it. Two years before his
death by drug overdose, Caminiti told a Sports Illustrated reporter that
he felt that steroids had become a "widely-accepted," and even
"necessary" means of maintaining a competitive edge in baseball.54
Caminiti estimated that "at least half" of all Major League players use
steroids, while Major League Baseball physicians estimated that ten to
fifteen percent of all minor leaguers they examined tested positive for
steroids.
Baseball success is an extremely lucrative resource that is
extremely rivalrous in consumption. Baseball success necessarily
precludes success by others. Achieving and maintaining a competitive
edge, even a small one, can be the difference between success and
failure. The incentives to cheat by using steroids and other
performance-enhancing substances is intense. In the same Sports
Illustrated interview, Caminiti offered this perspective on the use of
steroids:
"If a young player were to ask me what to do … I'm not
going to tell him it's bad. Look at all the money in the
game: You have a chance to set your family up, to get
your daughter into a better school.... So I can't say,
'Don't do it,' not when the guy next to you is as big as a
house and he's going to take your job and make the
money."55
While Caminiti evinces no regrets for using steroids, he
recognizes that steroids are a necessary evil due to the competitive
pressures of baseball. Putting aside the loss to those players that can
successfully cheat and could not succeed at baseball without cheating,
the vast majority of players would be better off with an effective and
enforceable ban on the use of performance-enhancing drugs.
Ballplayers would then face a baseball career not competing with
cheaters that use performance-enhancing drugs, not being pressured to
December 9, 2004, at B1; Dave Anderson, Is Anybody Listening to Caminiti's
Steroids Alarm? N.Y. TIMES, October 13, 2004 at D1.
54. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE, Totally Juiced: with the use of steroids
and other performance enhancers rampant, according to a former MVP and other
sources, baseball players and their reliance on drugs have grown to alarming
proportions, June 3, 2002, at 34.
55. Id.
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cheat, and if already cheating, not being pressured to cheat more, and
cheat in more expensive and even more unhealthful ways. It is thus the
players – the resource users – that truly do need to be saved from
themselves. Appeals by civil libertarians would ring somewhat hollow
in this context.
The mysterious deaths of eight young, apparently healthy
professional cyclists in a seventeen-month period spanning 2003 and
2004 would be shocking if there had not already been strong
suspicions that the sport is still plagued by the misuse of dangerous
performance-enhancing drugs and by dangerous blood doping
practices.56 Even 1998 Tour de France champion Marco Pantani, who
died mysteriously last year from a drug overdose, had been ejected
from a race in 1999 for blood doping, and had continually battled
allegations of blood doping and drug use since then.57 It is incredible
that cyclists persist in taking such high risks to succeed, particularly
one of Pantani's stature. But given the highly rivalrous nature of
winning cycling races, the incentive to cheat is apparently irresistible.
It is clear that it would be cyclists that would benefit from an
enforceable and effective ban, in that they would no longer be risking
their lives to succeed. The apparent impossibility of enforcing such a
ban, however, does not portend well for the sport.
III.

The Fish Problem

Despite the many applications of Hardin's tragedy of the
commons, open access fisheries have somehow borne out Hardin's
predictions the most faithfully.58 Examples abound, but a particularly
striking example of the depletion of fish stocks in an open access
situation is provided by the late nineteenth-century and early
twentieth-century Pacific halibut fishery. The Pacific halibut fishery
56. Ron Kroichick, Baseball has BALCO, but Europe is plagued with its own
sports drug scandal: EPO and bicycling, S.F. CHRON, May 9, 2004, at C1.
57. Obituaries, Marco Pantani, 34, Cyclist Plagued by Doping Allegations,
L.A. TIMES, February 15, 2004, at B19.
58. Hardin made the mistake of confusing a "commons" with "open access." It
is now commonly understood that a "commons" resource situation involves a
resource that is jointly owned by multiple individuals, while "open access" is one in
which there is no ownership at all. A common-pool resource is thus one that can be
considered as open access on the "inside," (within the group of joint owners) but
private property on the "outside" (outside the group of joint owners). Carol Rose,
The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades
and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 155 (1998).
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was unregulated until 1924,59 when the United States and Canada
created by treaty the International Pacific Halibut Commission, a body
charged with studying the halibut fishery and making
recommendations on halibut fishery management.60 Another treaty in
1931 implemented aggregate catch limits for several intensively-fished
areas,61 which produced an immediate reduction in amount of fishing
effort and a concomitant increase in fishing efficiency.62
The early twentieth-century history of the Pacific halibut
fishery illustrates: (i) the incentive for individual fishermen to
overfish, resulting in a collective overfishing; (ii) a general increase in
effort in fishing; and (iii) a markedly consistent decrease in fishing
efficiency, measured by quantity of catch per quantity of fishing effort.
Table 4 shows recorded pacific halibut landings on the Pacific Coast
of the Southeastern Alaska, Canada, and Washington State for the
years 1910 to 1933.63 In table 4, the second column shows the total
pounds of halibut landed for the year. The third column shows the
59. By "unregulated," I mean to say that there were no quantitative limitations
on fishing. American and Canadian halibut markets remained relatively open to
imports, and neither government were particularly inclined to exclude fishing boats
from their neighboring country. Thus, although there were still regulatory
requirements, they did not impose any limits on fishing. WILLIAM F. THOMPSON AND
F. HEWARD BELL, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION NO. 5:
BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF THE PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY 49-54 (1934), available
online at http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm.
60. The 1924 treaty also limited halibut fishing to nine months of the year.
However, since the bulk of the halibut fishing took place during these months
anyway, the seasonal limitation had little effect. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FISHERIES COMMISSION, NUMBER 1 14 (1931), available online at
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm.
61. WILLIAM F. THOMPSON AND F. HEWARD BELL, REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION NO. 6: BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF THE
PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN INTENSITY UPON TOTAL YIELD
11 (1931), available online at
AND YIELD PER UNIT OF GEAR
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm.
62. Id, at 13-14. Thompson and Bell concluded that "[t]he rise in catch per unit
… is due in 1932 and 1933 to regulation, which has deliberately held the total catch
at a level… WILLIAM F. THOMPSON AND F. HEWARD BELL, REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION NO. 8: BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF THE
PACIFIC
HALIBUT
FISHERY
23
(1931)
available
online
at
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm.
63. Pacific halibut were divided into two distinct stocks, one that stayed
generally south of Cape Spencer, near Juneau, and one that generally stayed west of
Cape Spencer. Id. at 18-21. Statistics for the other stock yielded results very similar
to the stock south of Cape Spencer. Id. at 12.
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total number of utilized "skates," groundfishing lines that have a fairly
standardized number of hooks per unit of length.64 The fourth column
shows the catch per skate, the measure of what is known in fisheries
economics as "catch-per-unit-effort," a measure of fishing efficiency.
Table 4
Number of
Catch per
Year
Pounds landed
Skates
Skate (lbs)
1910
51,849,240
191,325
271.0
56,931,796
240,219
237.0
1911
1912
60,379,550
343,066
176.0
56,235,579
436,273
128.9
1913
1914
45,276,669
364,840
124.1
1915
45,025,016
381,568
118.0
1916
30,218,908
263,690
114.6
1917
31,602,797
386,342
81.8
1918
27,070,659
309,379
87.5
1919
27,402,631
332,960
82.3
1920
33,158,192
394,271
84.1
1921
37,476,466
487,340
76.9
1922
31,294,067
499,915
62.6
1923
28,844,269
504,270
57.2
1924
27,004,148
483,945
55.8
1925
23,941,311
462,187
51.8
1926
25,790,876
494,078
52.2
1927
24,630,370
498,588
49.4
1928
27,209,093
569,228
47.8
1929
26,253,998
653,085
40.2
1930
22,598,895
643,843
35.1
1931
22,473,326
548,130
41.0
1932
22,881,718
456,721
50.1
1933
23,599,734
452,970
52.1
Source: William F. Thompson and F. Heward Bell, Report
of the International Fisheries Commission No. 8: Biological
Statistics of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, available online at
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm.
64. Id at 21.
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Several interesting trends should be noted in table 4. First, with the
exception of just a few years up to 1931, there was an increase in the
number of skates each year, a measure of the amount of fishing effort
expended each year. Second, with the exception of just three years
before 1931, there was a decrease in fishing efficiency each year.
Third, there was a general downward trend in the total amount of
halibut landed.
The lessons of the early twentieth-century halibut fishery are
two-fold. Clearly, regulation was needed to save the resource. But just
as importantly, regulation was needed to save the fishermen from
themselves. As fishing efficiency spiraled steadily downward,
fishermen were caught in a dynamic of having to fish just to salvage
what they could from a depleted stock. Failure to fish, giving up on the
race to fish, meant having their only valuable capital asset – their boat
– sit idle. With many fishermen still paying off loans on their boats,
idleness was not an option.
The poverty trap that has engulfed many fishing communities
is in fact what has motivated economists to study the open access
fishing problem. As early as 1955, H. Scott Gordon derived the
mechanism by which fishing communities invariably fished
themselves into a bust cycle in which they discovered an abundant fish
species, rushed in with too many boats, and wound up overfishing the
stock to the brink of a collapse, the fish stocks utterly unable to
provide fishing communities with sufficient income to fend of
poverty.65
Regulation was thus needed not only to save the Pacific
halibut, but to save the halibut fishing industry.66 This latter aspect is
the one conveniently overlooked by categorical opponents of
regulation. There is often the implicit assumption that any form of
65. Gordon's theoretical findings find support from studies of the halibut case.
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. THOMPSON AND F. HEWARD BELL, REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION NO. 5: BIOLOGICAL STATISTICS OF THE
PACIFIC
HALIBUT
FISHERY
10
(1931),
available
online
at
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm ("The great effect of
inconspicuous mechanical changes and of cheaper power explains on the one hand
the present existence of the fishery despite a greatly lowered abundance, and on the
other indicates … that the decline will be continued far beyond the limit which seems
at present profitable." (emphasis added)).
66. For one of many accounts of how the failure to regulate resulted in the
wreckage of the Eastern cod fishery, see MICHAEL HARRIS, LAMENT FOR AN OCEAN:
THE COLLAPSE OF THE ATLANTIC COD FISHERY (1999).
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regulation is a subtraction from an individual right, and that it
invariably diminishes the wealth or utility of the regulated
individual.67 What this overlooks are the gains to be had from
cooperation, and gains that can be created by institutions,
governmental or otherwise, that facilitate and even mandate
cooperation.
IV.

The Campaign Finance Problem
A.

Overfishing for Votes

Ubiquitous campaign advertisements in all kinds of media
seem to have accomplished two things: numbing the voting electorate
to campaign advertisements, and cultivating a concern over the role of
money in political campaigns, particularly federal ones.68 The
pervasive nature of campaign advertising has dulled voters' senses to
the messages behind the advertising. One study reported that
registered voters saw an average of almost eight campaign ads on TV
per day during the 2002 Congressional campaign cycle.69 At the same
time, the sheer volume of campaign advertising has made people
wonder how it can be that candidates for political office can have such
huge sums of money to spend on advertising. Ballooning campaign
expenditures and an increasing amount of time and effort of politicians
spend fundraising have fueled a suspicion money has gained more
than just a toehold over political institutions and processes. Former
Congressman Lee Hamilton, as director of the Center on Congress at
Indiana University, has lamented this voter cynicism:

67. Reagan administration Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge
disapproved a plan to introduce individual transferable quotas to the beleaguered
halibut fishery because it "ran counter to free market principles." As aides
explained, "[a]s an Administration, we're just opposed to limiting fishing to only
those who have formerly fished... We are concerned that it would interfere with
basic economic liberties." John Balzar, A Catch as Catch Can Fish Plan, L.A. Times,
June 28, 1992, at A1.
68. States have not been spared from the cycle of campaign spending for statewide elections. The number of PACs in Virginia to address state elections has
doubled in the last four years, reflecting the ballooning costs of seeking statewide
elective office. R.H. Melton, Campaign Costs Soar, Prompting Va. Power PACs,
WASHINGTON POST, June 2, 2003, at B1.
69. David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson, Campaign 2002: the Perfect Storm,
Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Brigham Young University.
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The rising flood of money that flows into campaigns
also undermines general public trust in the political
system. Many Americans feel it is the money, not ideas
and not principles, that reigns supreme in our political
system. I often heard people say that the political
process was run by the moneyed interests, so they saw
little reason to vote.70
This widespread suspicion only exacerbates the anesthetizing
properties of campaign speech. A perception that a political candidate
has been bought and paid for only dulls the viewer to the substantive
aspects (if any) of campaign speech. A report by the Pew Center for
the People and the Press found that while the 2000 presidential
campaign was generally better in terms of information available,
candidates’ commercials were considered less effective than they were
in 1992.71 One might not be surprised that pundits are crying foul quite
loudly,72 but not even critics of campaign finance reform proposals
believe that the system we have for running political campaigns is
adequate.73
Debates about the efficacy of and problems with campaign
speech, however, are rarely followed by satisfying discussion of
solutions. The greatest obstacle to solving the campaign finance
problem is that almost any conceivable solution would somehow
impinge upon Constitutionally-protected speech. And even campaign
finance reform advocates seem willing to concede the notion put forth
by Justice Holmes that more speech is always better. In Abrams v.
70. Lee Hamilton, The Money Chase, The Center on Congress at Indiana
University,
available
online
at
http://congress.indiana.edu/radio_commentaries/the_money_chase.php (last visited
on January 17, 2005).
71. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, CAMPAIGN 2000
HIGHLY RATED (November 16, 2000), available online at http://peoplepress.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=23.
72. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Level the Presidential Playing Field, WASH.
POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at B7; E.J. Dionne Jr., How to Fix Financing, WASH. POST,
Nov. 28, 2003, at A41; Thomas Edsall & Dan Balz, Kerry to Forgo Public
Campaign Financing; Democrat Says He Will Use His Own Money, WASH. POST,
Nov. 16, 2003, at A12; Editorial, Your Turn; Fix the Finance Rules for Presidential
Races; The Public-Financing Program for Presidential Candidates, Designed to
Even the Playing Field, is Broken, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWs, Nov. 12, 2003, at
6B.
73. BRADLEY SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH x (2001).
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U.S.,74 Holmes argued in dissent for a "free trade in ideas" and "that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market…."75 This led to the popularization of
the phrase "marketplace of ideas," coined by Justice Brennan76 to
describe the notion that the best way to ascertain the truth is to have
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" discussion77 serve as an open
competition of ideas. The freer the discussion, the more robust the
competition, and the more certain the truth, would go the reasoning.
The battle over campaign finance reform has been waged with
this truism in mind. The campaign finance problem is seen as a clash
of the principles of equality and freedom of speech, with free
campaign spending being equated with free speech.78 Reform
advocates have argued that equality principles have become
jeopardized, and that regulation is warranted to correct the heavy bias
towards those interest groups that tend to be well-funded.79 Detractors
of campaign finance reform, on the other hand, argue that given the
necessarily clumsy and ultimately flawed ways of regulating campaign
finance, it is better to stick with the principle that is easier to defend –
freedom of speech, and relative freedom to contribute to campaigns.
Some reform advocates take their cue from Justice Stevens's
dissent in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,80 and take issue
with the notion that campaign finance is purely "speech." Their
argument has been that campaign contributions implicate property
interests, not speech interests.81 This view would presumably bifurcate
the spending of money and the use of the money to purchase speech,
as acts of separate legal import. For purposes of this Article, I put
74. 250 U.S. 616 (1917).
75. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
76. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.
concurring).
77. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
78. MARTIN REDISH, MONEY TALK$ 136-39 (2001); BRADLEY A. SMITH,
UNFREE SPEECH 12-13 (2001).
79. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance and the Social Inequality
Paradox, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 955 (2004); Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz,
The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed
Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-PerVoter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204
(1994).
80. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000).
81. Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property
Characteristics of Political Money 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235 (2000); REDISH, supra,
note 78, at 122-25.
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aside this objection to consider the impacts of the spending and the
speech, taken together.
Neither reform advocates or detractors have examined the
underlying premise of the free speech argument: that more speech is
always better. "Better" in what sense? At the margins, more speech is
always better for the speaker – no campaign ever makes a conscious
decision to simply remove their candidate from the airwaves,
newspapers, and billboards, or to unilaterally disarm. But it is
becoming clear that at certain levels of campaign speech, it becomes
so ubiquitous and so commodified that it loses its effectiveness.82
And yet, candidates for political and even judicial office face
ever-increasing demands to engage in more and more campaign
speech. This, in turn, has led to ever-increasing pressure to raise
money, surely one of the most unpleasant tasks facing campaigners.
Hubert Humphrey called it a "disgusting, degrading, demeaning
experience."83 But raising large sums of money has become essential
to seeking public office, and almost from the very moment that an
election victory is secured, candidates must begin their new cycle
anew, often raising money the morning after an election victory,
giving rise to the coinage of the phrase "permanent campaign."84 This
de facto obligation is very much contrary to the purpose of seeking
elected office in the first place: to serve the public. Candidates
routinely miss important activities such as floor votes on important
legislation so that they can raise more money.85 A recent survey of

82. It has become widely noted that trends seem to indicate a growing
disillusionment on the part of the voting electorate with the political campaign
process generally. Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons For Democracy: An
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1, 3-4 (1996).
83. Hamilton, supra, note 70.
84. See, e.g., NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN AND THOMAS E. MANN, THE PERMANENT
CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE (2000); James A. Thurber, Is the Permanent Campaign
Alive
and
Well
After
9/11?
Available
online
at
http://www.american.edu/spa/ccps/pdffiles/permenent.pdf (last visited January 17,
2005).
85. During the 2004 Presidential campaign cycle, Democratic Presidential
Hopeful Dick Gephardt, for example, missed 85% of the House floor votes for the
first part of 2003, and eventual nominee John Kerry missed over 50%. Juliet
Eilperin, Gephardt, Kerry Miss the Most Hill Votes; Two Draw Focus of
Republicans Tallying Absences of White House Hopefuls, WASH. POST, June 1,
2003, at A04. Former Congressman Lee Hamilton, as Director of the Center on
Congress at Indiana University, has lamented that the "money chase distorts the
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2200 federal, state, and local candidates reported that more than half
of those running for statewide office and 43 percent of those running
for Congress spent at least one-quarter of their time raising money,86
while seventeen percent spent more than half their time raising
money.87 Failure to keep pace with an opponent in fundraising allows
the opponent to use airwaves to define the campaign, monopolize
public attention, and worst of all, launch attacks that go unanswered.
Therein is lies the paradox: candidates must raise more and more
money to engage in more and more campaign speech, but are finding
their speech increasingly ineffective in reaching the hearts and minds
of voters. Voters put off by the barrage of campaign speech have
responded by not voting. It is an arms race of campaign fundraising
and spending.
There are strong parallels between the overfishing problem and
the campaign finance problem that illustrate the dynamics of a tragedy
of the commons. Both involve a rival resource. In the case of
overfishing, the resource is obviously the fish stock, while in the
campaign finance problem the resource is the ability of political
candidates to reach the hearts and minds of voters that face competing
demands on their time and attention. Both involve the degradation of
this resource. In fishing, the fish stock deteriorates, while in the
campaign finance context voter interest in campaign messages is lost.
Both problems involve overexploitation of the resource. Just as
fishermen take too many fish, political candidates go to the airwaves
too often to try and get a message across to voters. Because more
speech is always better from the viewpoint of an individual candidate,
the incentive is for the candidate to speak until she has no more money
left in her campaign coffers. In essence, the candidate is wasting the
resource by using it too intensively and too often.
In both situations, individual interests conflict with collective
interests. In both situations, the rational course of action from the
individual viewpoint is to continue to exploit and ruin the resource,
because if any one individual refrains, it cannot count on other
political process, crowding out other activities like writing laws, thinking about
public policy, or meeting with ordinary voters…." Lee Hamilton, supra, note 70.
86. Peter L. Francia, Paul S. Herrnson, Begging for Buck – Campaign
Fundraising, Campaigns & Elections, April 2001, available online at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2519/is_2_22/ai_74410584 (last visited
January 11, 2005).
87. Paul S. Herrnson, The Campaign Assessment and Candidate Outreach
Project, 2000 Survey (Univ. of Maryland, 2000).
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individuals to also refrain. The result would be that while the resource
is ruined, the refraining individual is the only one that does not enjoy
the temporary benefit of the ruination of the resource. Campaigning
politicians face this dilemma. There is no incentive to ever refrain
from campaigning, or raising money to do it. While campaigning
politicians spend less effectively the more they spend, abstention
would still be tantamount to capitulation.
Both problems are serious problems that may have profound
long-term consequences. Once a fish species is overfished, it will take
years for it to recover, if it even can recover. Slow-growing sea
mammals such as whales may not ever recover from Norwegian and
Japanese whaling practices.88 In political campaigns, once the
electorate becomes sufficiently cynical and disillusioned by the
methods of financing and prosecuting political campaigns, it may take
a long time for voter interest and confidence to return.
Some observations can be made about the campaign speech
effort that are similar to those made about fishing effort. Data on
campaign spending and voter turnout in U.S. federal elections can be
used to illustrate that campaign spending and spending effectiveness
has followed a pattern similar to that of halibut fishing and fishing
effort.
B.

U.S. Data

As a proxy for campaign speech effort, I use total dollars spent
in a federal campaign cycle on U.S. House of Representatives and
U.S. Senate campaigns.89 There is certainly some inexactness of this
measure, as there is with using skates to measure fishing effort. Some
campaigns involve close races that draw more money than would
otherwise be the case. Some campaigns, such as those conducted by
independently wealthy candidates such as 1996 Senate candidate
Michael Huffington and Senators Jon Corzine and Herb Kohl, draw
88. Martha Mendoza, Fans Thrill to the Denizens of the Deep, L.A. TIMES,
February 24, 2002 at B1. A moratorium on commercial whaling imposed by the
International Whaling Commissions has been ignored by signatory states, including
Japan and Norway, while they invoke its provisions to conduct "scientific research"
on thousands of whales. Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global
Governance, 22 MICH. J. INTL. L. 1, 57-62 (2000). Since the imposition of the ban in
1986, Norway and Japan have killed approximately 18,000 whales.
89. I also analyzed data on campaign receipts, and the empirical findings did
not change.
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upon huge private reserves of money. However, money remains a
better proxy than any other conceivable measure of campaigning
effort. Data on person-hours spent on the campaign trail, or on
fundraising efforts, even if it existed, would be unreliable.
Data on U.S. federal elections from 1976 to 2002 is used for
analysis. This period is bookended by two major changes in the law on
campaign finance: Buckley v. Valeo90 was decided in 1976, upholding
most of the provisions of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA"). Prior to 1974, no limits on direct contributions, or "hard
money," were in effect, and FECA's limits on hard money were upheld
in Buckley v. Valeo. In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
("BCRA"), or popularly known as McCain-Feingold (after the Senate
sponsors), or Shays-Meehan (after the House sponsors) was passed
and took effect on November 6, 2002, the day after Election Day.91
The BCRA was upheld in large part by the U.S. Supreme Court in
McConnell v. FEC.92 The BCRA has many effects, but for our
purposes the most important were to raise the direct contribution limit
from $1,000 to $2,000,93 and to limit the use of soft money as a source
of funding in campaigns.94 It would be inappropriate to compare
expenditure data before and after BCRA, as direct contributions
between $1,000 and $2,000 could skew the fundraising data, as could
differences in PAC contributions. While the Federal Election
Commission continued to make significant rulings during this period
from 1978 to 2002, I assume that there were no changes to the legal
environment with respect to campaign fundraising and spending that
would bias results.
Presidential election years are different from midterm federal
election years in both spending and voter turnout. Spending is clearly
greater in Presidential years, but voter turnout is much greater in
Presidential years. The result is that campaign spending efficiency –
measured in terms of votes per dollar spent – is invariably greater in
Presidential years. For illustrative purposes, I thus divide the data into
two sets, shown in Tables 5 and 6.

90. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
91. BCRA, P.L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, § 402 (March 27, 2002).
92. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
93. BCRA § 307, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2002).
94. BCRA § 307, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2002), limiting the amount of
money that can be contributed by "multicandidate political committees."
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Table 5 – Campaign Expenditures in U.S. House and Senate
Campaigns, Presidential Election Years
Voter turnout
Votes per
(adjusted for 2002
dollar spent
voter registration)
$309,375,000
106,919,135
0.346
1976
$417,706,446
105,496,502
0.253
1980
$553,907,457
102,279,658
0.185
1984
$618,600,300
98,956,292
0.160
1988
$637,897,436
105,649,989
0.166
1992
$715,896,552
96,857,224
0.135
1996
$886,197,917
104,300,496
0.118
2000
Source: Federal Election Commission. http://www.fec.gov.
Year

Total dollars spent
(2002 dollars)

Table 6 – Campaign Expenditures in U.S. House and Senate
Campaigns, Midterm Election Years
Voter turnout
Votes per
Year
(adjusted for 2002
dollar spent
voter registration)
$426,388,889
79,533,230
0.187
1978
$533,507,393
81,684,886
0.153
1982
$655,829,152
74,486,037
0.114
1986
$533,780,822
76,766,507
0.144
1990
$714,536,585
80,935,063
0.113
1994
$674,076,923
75,510,851
0.112
1998
$770,180,000
78,390,424
0.102
2002
Source: Federal Election Commission. http://www.fec.gov.
Total dollars spent
(2002 dollars)

Two adjustments are made to the data: the Consumer Price Index95 is
used to adjust dollar figures for inflation,96 and Census Bureau data is

95. Available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.
96. Since the direct contribution limit under FECA remained at $1,000 for the
entire period, and argument could be made that no adjustment for inflation should be
made at all. Not adjusting for inflation would render the argument in this article
stronger.
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used to adjust voter turnout data for growth in the voting-age
population.97
To be sure, the nature of campaign spending changed
dramatically during this period. To reach voters, politicians have used
buttons, signposts, bumper stickers, radio and TV advertising,
telephone solicitations, and internet advertising. This is no different
from fishing, however; different fishing technologies have made
fishing more efficient and more destructive over time. Similarly, TV
and internet access have clearly been great technological advances, but
overuse of these technologies for campaign advertising has similarly
reduced their usefulness.
There are clearly similarities between this data and that shown
in Table 6 for halibut fishing. When an adjustment is made to account
for growth in the voting-age population, it is not clear that there is a
downward trend in voter turnout over time, as there is in halibut
landed. But there is in both data sets an observable upward trend in
expenditures, and an observable downward trend in efficiency, as
measured by catch per skate and by votes per dollar. The data from
Tables 5 and 6 are set out in Figure 7, along with the data from Table
4, containing data from halibut fishing discussed above, set out in
Figure 8.

97. Estimates on the number of voting age Americans and data on voter
registration
data
are
from
the
Census
Bureau.
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/tabA-1.xls
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Figure 7
Votes Per Dollar Spent
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Although the similar downward trends in campaign spending
efficiency and fishing efficiency are obvious, there are a number of
possible explanations for the downward trend in campaign expenditure
efficiency other than the existence of an inexorable tragedy of the
commons. Given the small number of observations, it is impossible to
conclusively test hypotheses on the causes of decreasing campaign
spending effectiveness. However, the data from Presidential-year and
Midterm-year elections can be pooled using a dummy variable to
capture the differential effects, and the resulting fourteen observations
will permit us to at least entertain some suggestions.
One alternative explanation is that increasing income has led to
more disposable income that can be used to fund campaigns, leading
to more money being pumped into the political campaign effort. If this
were true, then there is no market failure because increased campaign
spending is simply a reflection of this particular effect of greater
disposable income.
Another alternative explanation is that increased campaign
spending is simply due to increased advertising expenditures. It could
be that political candidates are simply spending more money because
it takes more to compete with potato chip commercials or automobile
commercials. This does not, however, necessarily preclude a tragedy
of the commons explanation; it may simply reflect the possibility that
campaign speech and advertising are all caught up in a tragedy of the
commons.
Another possible alternative is that increased competitiveness
of certain races has accentuated the important of these races, and led to
an infusion of money into these races. However, the available
evidence suggests that federal campaigns have become less
competitive, not more. Incumbency re-election rates have been
increasing for decades.98
Another possible alternative explanation is that voters have
been turned off by a number of factors other than campaign spending.
One might argue, for example, that political partisanship has turned off
98. Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning, Incumbency,
Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition for U.S. House Elections, working
paper, Department of Political Science, Emory University (2004), available online at
http://www.emergingdemocraticmajorityweblog.com/spsa/spsa.html (last visited
January 29, 2005); Smith, supra, note 73, at 36-37; PAUL S. HERRNSON,
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON 28-34
(2004); John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in Congressional
Elections, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166, 166 (1977).
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voters, and caused them to turn out in lower numbers. This also runs
counter to the evidence available, as political party identity seems to
be on the decline.99 If one takes party loyalty as a measure of
partisanship, then, one can say that partisanship has been decreasing,
not increasing, over time.
Professor John Lott has empirically tested the hypothesis that
the growth in the size of government has accounted for the growth in
the amount of campaign spending.100 This hypothesis is not
inconsistent with the hypothesis advanced in this Article. To the extent
that Lott is claiming that there are increasing favors to be gotten from
helping to fund elections, and that this has led to increasing attempts to
curry favor with aspiring politicians, it is only natural that voters
would be disillusioned with the degree of campaign spending,
recognizing it for what it is: a symptom of the growing influence of
money over political institutions. Lott's prescription, to shrink the size
of government, is not necessarily inconsistent with prescriptions for
solving the tragedy of campaign spending commons, though Lott is
clear in his conviction that any other prescription would merely be
addressing symptoms and not root causes.101 The suggestive findings
in this Article are not inconsistent with Lott's.
A test for the effect of a tragedy of the commons can be
accomplished by regressing the reciprocal of campaign spending
efficiency – dollar spent per vote for U.S. House and Senate
campaigns – against a simple time trend variable, the election year.
The general form of the model estimated is
Campaign Expenditures/Votesi =

+ 1 PresDummy + 2Yeari +
2 ln GDPi +
3 ln Ad Expendituresi + i

0

The dependent variable is thus the reciprocal of the campaign
spending efficiency. PresDummy is a dummy variable indicating an
election taking place in a presidential election year. GDP is per capita
99. Russell J. Dalton, The Decline of Party Identifications in PARTIES WITHOUT
PARTISANS: POLITICAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES (Russell
J. Dalton, Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., 2000).
100. John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures
Are Increasing: the Government is Getting Bigger, 43 J. L. & ECON.359 (2000).
101. Lott, supra, note 100, at 360. Lott warns that attempting to restrict
contributions would simply force would-be contributors to substitute in-kind
contributions for monetary donations. Id, at 362.
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income, in 2000 dollars,102 and Ad Expenditures is the total amount of
money spent nationally on advertising, also adjusted for inflation.103 I
use the natural logarithm for these two variables.104 A positive
coefficient on the year variable thus represents the decreasing
effectiveness, over time, of campaign spending. Results are shown in
Table 7 below.
Table 7
(n=14; t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent variable: Campaign Expenditures / Vote
Model 1
Year only

Model 2
Advertising
only

Model 3
GDP only

Model 4
All

R2

0.90

0.93

0.89

0.96

Adjusted
R2

0.88

0.92

0.87

0.94

Intercept

-369.6
(-7.90)

-61.8
(-8.92)

-86.9
(-7.20)

-422.4
(-2.26)

Presidential
Election
Dummy

-1.73
(-4.57)

-1.78
(-5.73)

-1.77
(-4.56)

-1.76
(-6.42)

Year

0.190
(8.07)

ln Ad
Expend
ln GDP

0.250
(2.04)
5.77
(10.06)

10.84
(3.45)
9.27
(7.85)

-20.96
(-2.30)

102. GDP data is obtained from a website provided by Economic History
Services: http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp/ (last visited January 30, 2005).
103. National advertising data is obtained from Bob Coen's Insider Report,
archived at http://www.universalmccann.com/ourview.html (last visited January 12,
2005).
104. A Box-Cox test indicated that a linear model might also provide a fit, but
empirically, the log-linear models provided slightly more predictive models.
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With just 14 observations, these results can only be considered
suggestive. But the signs of coefficients rarely switch, and the
coefficient for the dummy for Presidential Election Years is very
consistent. These results point us towards some interesting inferences.
First, the time trend variable is positive and significant, and the
coefficients of similar magnitude in both models 1 and 4, indicating
that we may at least entertain the suggestion that declining efficiency
over time is indicative of a tragedy of the commons pattern of
campaign fundraising and spending. Second, the best explanatory
variable is ln Ad Expenditures. Does this suggest that campaign
spending has been increasing only because general advertising
expenditures are increasing? This is possible, but if true, this would
not render less plausible the hypothesis that campaign spending
efficiency is a tragedy of the commons. It would entirely consistent to
offer a complementary hypothesis: that advertising spending in general
follows a tragedy of the commons pattern. However, because private
rents from advertising are so high, this is likely to be tolerated for a
longer time by private advertising spenders.
It is interesting to compare these results with those obtained by
Lott. Using a slightly different specification, Lott found a highly
significant relationship between campaign spending and government
size, but Lott's regressions also found a significant time trend
relationship.105 Since Lott's was simply trying to control for timesensitive effects, he did not comment on the significance of his time
trend variable.
I am not prepared to make the strong claim that I have proven
that the tragedy of the commons fully explains spiraling campaign
spending. Strictly speaking, this latter proposition would be difficult to
conclusively prove, requiring the rejection of all other possible and
incompatible explanations. However, the combination of anecdotal
evidence and the statistical inferences in this case should give us
reason to consider the possibility carefully. Does a tragedy of the
commons explanation seem more or less likely than the alternative
explanations? Does it ring true that we are pouring money into
campaigns, and candidates are pouring effort into fundraising and
spending, because we are simply wealthier, and can afford it? Perhaps
spiraling advertising costs are to blame, possibly its own tragedy of the
commons that has spilled over into the political arena. But in all of the
105. Lott, supra, note 100, at 383.
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hand-wringing by politicians and by pundits and concerned citizen
groups over campaign spending, not one, to my knowledge, invokes
increased advertising expenses as the root cause of spiraling campaign
spending.
Future research may involve data in which the time trends in
GDP data or advertising data can be separated out. In the meantime,
we should be willing to acknowledge that perhaps, we are facing too
much campaign speech and too much campaign spending, and that it
does our political candidates no good to give them unfettered rights to
raise money and spend it.
C.

Is U.S. Campaign Spending "Excessive"?

I do not make the claim that campaign spending is inefficiently
high due to a tragedy of the commons dynamic, such that we have
reached the equivalent of rent dissipation. More evidence is needed
before this strong claim is made. Indeed, most scholars in the field of
campaign finance balk at the suggestion that campaign spending and
concomitant campaign advertising is in any sense of the word
"excessive." The problem with campaign spending, as Professors
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres have argued, is that most campaigns
are underfinanced, and not overfinanced.106 As Ackerman and Ayres
note, campaign expenditures for the 2000 election cycle totaled $3
billion, while automobile advertisement expenditures totaled $13
billion, and total TV advertising expenditures totaled $66 billion.107
Critics of campaign finance reform, of course, chime in with more
examples of expenditures on trivial goods and how they dwarf
political campaign expenditures.108
In terms of raw spending amounts, perhaps $3 billion is too
small a sum to be spending on a matter far more important than the
type of automobiles we buy, or the sum total of all the other fairly
106. BRUCE ACKERMAN AND IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
CAMPAIGN FINANCE PARADIGM 85 (2002) (citing a study by fourteen campaign
finance experts that the problem is "not too much spending, but too little…" See
also, CAMPAIGN REFORM: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE, REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON
CAMPAIGN REFORM, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (2002), available online at
Richard
Briffault,
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~lbartels/campaignreform/;
Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting With Dollars, 91 Cal. L.
Rev. 643, 657-48 (2003).
107. Id.
108. Bradley Smith notes that Americans spend two to three times more on
potato chips than on political campaigns. Smith, supra, note 73, at 35.
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trivial consumer expenditure decisions we make that bring on the
spending of $66 billion advertising per year. However, the conclusion
must be more nuanced than that. Ackerman and Ayres fully recognize
that the problem is the taint of the money that is used to fund these
campaign expenditures – hence their ingenious proposal to establish a
secret donation booth for campaign donations.109 Thus, in the overall
sense, campaign spending is too small a part of our budget. This is
why Ackerman and Ayres's proposal to subsidize campaign spending
makes sense. More spending on campaign speech is not necessarily a
bad, provided that it is funded by the right type of sources. However,
the amount of campaign speech and spending of the nature currently
predominant is not a good or effective thing, precisely for the reasons
that Ackerman and Ayres and others have recognized: the lack of
credibility associated with campaign speech that seems too closely tied
to unseemly regulated interests. A reform critic, FEC Chairman
Bradley Smith, has allied himself with the John Lott argument: that
campaign expenditures are rising because of the growth of
government, federal and state.110 But this seems to concede that voters
view money as a corrupting influence, since this causal relationship
implies a quid pro quo in large campaign contributions by large
donors.
An economic analysis illustrates this point. Ackerman and
Ayres lament that campaign spending is less than one-fourth of
spending on automobile advertisements. This is exactly what we
would expect, however. Automobile advertising is a private good, as
opposed to the public good of campaign speech; at least that's what the
pretense is. Assuming that auto advertising and the campaign
advertising expenditures can be modeled as declining-marginal benefit
enterprises with constant marginal costs (as Gordon modeled
overfishing111) a comparison of the two markets reveals that the higher
marginal and average products of auto advertising, owing to the
private nature of its rents, is higher than that of campaign advertising.
This is show in Figure 9.

109. Supra, note 106, at 25-44, 93-110.
110. Smith, supra, note 73, at 35.
111. See text accompanying figure 5, infra.
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Figure 9
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We expect auto advertisements to be more frequent, because
we expect auto manufacturers to appropriate the rents from auto
advertising. However, an idealistic voter does not expect campaign
advertising to be very high, because she does not expect that campaign
advertising yields a result that inures to the private benefit of the
campaigning politician – unless, of course, there are quid pro quos
involved with the campaign donations,112 in which case we expect the
level of campaign spending to rise, concomitant with the higher
average and marginal product of campaign advertising. Marginal and
average products of advertising are no longer low, because there is a
generous private benefit that inures to the campaigning politician – a

112. Much has been written on whether there is a causal connection between
political contributions and voting patterns of recipients. See, e.g., Stephen G.
Bronars and John R. Lott, Jr., Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician
Votes? 40 J. LAW & ECON. 317 (1997); Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign
Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J.
606 (1991); Thomas Stratmann, Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies
of Political Action Committees, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 647 (1992); Henry W. Chappell,
Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous ProbitTobit Model, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 77 (1982); W.P. Welch, Campaign
Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports, 35
WESTERN POL. SCI. QUARTERLY 478 (1982). Suffice it say, however, the perception
that there is a quid pro quo is harmful enough to the electoral process.
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secure job113 of relative wealth and power in the United States
Congress. The higher level of campaign advertising is thus a signal to
the voter that average productivity of campaign dollars has increased,
and that unsavory, if perfectly legal, funding sources are involved.
The Ackerman and Ayres proposal to attempt to infuse
campaign speech with more frequent speech, more meaningful speech,
and less cynical perceptions on the part of voters is an ingenious one.
Like most public funding proposals, they attempt to infuse campaign
dollars into those campaigns that need and deserve it the most – those
meritorious yet underfunded candidates that face a political machine
with generous private funding sources that benefit from the
incumbent's power. But by providing some free "Patriot" dollars to
such candidates, the Ackerman/Ayres proposal not only funnels some
money to the underdog, but also confers upon voters some expressive
power by virtue of their being able to designate recipients for their
Patriot dollars. At the same time, it raises the bar for private giving to
incumbents with less-than-noble motivations for seeking and
maintaining public office. The dual effects of this proposal are to
subsidize those for whom campaign spending tends to be too low, and
discourage giving to those for whom campaign spending tends to be
too lavish, flattening differences in spending between well-endowed
and poorly-endowed candidates. A graphical illustration is provided in
Figure 10. The higher average product (AP) for the favorite reflects
the greater private returns from campaign spending, in the form of job
security in politics, and also perhaps a payback position upon
retirement.114 The higher MC for money raised privately beyond the
Patriot dollars (for which the MC is zero) represents the greater
difficulty of raising this money, since donors will be more reluctant to
contribute when it comes on top of the large base of Patriot dollars.
Note the gap in campaign spending, between qunder and qfav, is
113. Incumbency rates have been increasing for decades. Various explanations
are offered for various periods. Bradley Smith argues that campaign finance
limitations have disadvantaged challengers. See, e.g., Smith, supra, note 73, at 34-36.
Numerous theories pertaining to redistricting activities have been put forth. See, e.g.,
Andrew Gelman and Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
.
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541 (1994); Abramowitz, et al., supra, note 98
Also see other citations at note 98, supra.
114. Billy Tauzin retired in 2004 after twelve terms as a Congressman to head up
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, a drug industry trade
group, a position for which he will receive a $2 million salary. Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Washington Talk; Lawmaker's Plans to Lobby Raises Issue of Crossing Line, N.Y.
TIMES, February 7, 2004, at A12.
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relatively small, indicating the greater parity of spending power among
competitors in this scheme. In the meantime, the speech becomes more
credible, being provided in large part by Patriot dollars instead of
private donations for which some political favor is expected.
Figure 10
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However, all this is not to say that campaign spending is too
low and thus not tragedy of the commons. Rather, it is an
acknowledgement that some form of public funding of political
campaigns would serve to improve the efficiency of campaign dollars
spent. That is, it could be that campaign speech is only excessive
because it is perceived by the voter to be tainted. The presence of the
taint is what renders current levels of campaign speech excessive.
Indeed, it is possible (though admittedly unlikely) that we would find,
contrary to Ackerman and Ayres's suspicions, that less money is
required to launch an effective campaign once the taint of money is
removed. Ackerman and Ayres's proposal, to remove the taint by way
of a form of public financing – a form that engages the public by
involving it with distributional decisions – is thus aimed at flipping the
campaign speech world from the incredible to the credible, but it does
not necessarily relieve the candidates and the public from the
inexorable push to engage in a fundraising and spending derby.
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Why Don't Resource Users Want to Be Saved From
Themselves?

The most interesting question raised by true tragedies of the
commons is why it has proven so difficult to save resource users from
their own self-destructive behavior. If resource users benefit from
limits on their own behavior, why don't resource users demand
regulation? In some instances, they do. In The Theory of Economic
Regulation,115 Stigler illustrated how some regulated industries came
about by the co-option of government by industries seeking protection
from new entry and competition. A less cynical view of Stigler's
theory might be that resource users sought the government's
"coercive"116 powers to arrest wasteful over-exploitation. In other
instances, even in the absence of governmental regulation, resource
users coordinate behavior to avoid wasteful overexploitation, as
studied by Elinor Ostrom's and others.117 But the reality of tragedies of
the commons is such that most often, tragedies of the commons are not
solved, despite the obvious and sometimes huge gains to be had.
Economists have some difficulty explaining the persistence of
tragedies of the commons that remain unsolved by coordination or
regulation. Explaining this persistence seems to require some
relaxation of assumptions of rationality, and some concessions to
behavioral economists. Professor Barton Thompson has applied some
of the behavioral economics literature to environmental tragedies of
the commons, most notably overfishing and groundwater
overdrafting.118 Thompson has attempted to explain why so many
environmental tragedies of the commons have remained unresolved,
and why, given the tremendous potential gains, we do not see more cooperation or regulation.119 Much of the answer, Thompson finds, is
that resource users harbor a variety of what can best be described as
pathologies that cause them to oppose any sort of co-operative or
regulatory arrangement that would extricate them from their particular
tragedy. Roughly, the pathologies fall into three categories: the
115. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
116. Stigler's view of government and rent-seeking by regulated industries was
based upon the one thing government can offer industries: its "power to coerce." Id.
at 4.
117. Supra, note 2.
118. Supra, note 27.
119. Supra, note 27.
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difficulty of giving up perceived rights, self-serving notions of
fairness, and undue optimism.
In the case of fisheries, fishermen, like most other people, are
inherently skeptical when asked to surrender a current right in
exchange for a future benefit, even if the potential upside is very
great.120 Thus, curtailing fishing effort, even if the benefit is a healthier
stock to fish in the future, is viewed as a sacrifice even if the net result
is a gain. It could be, as Thompson argues, that people simply frame
gains and losses differently, discounting future gains relative to current
losses.121 Or it could be that an "endowment effect"122 causes people
hold onto their perceived entitlements with irrational stubbornness.
Transportation planners would sympathize. In solving traffic problems
they must deal with drivers who want traffic problems solved without
their giving up their right to drive. There is a reason that the most
popular solutions involve more government provisions, such as more
roads or more subsidization of transit services, and rarely impose any
costs upon drivers.123 One study found that some drivers even resent
high-occupancy vehicle lanes as "special treatment" for other drivers,
failing to recognize that they could pick up a passenger and become
eligible themselves.124
Second, fixing resource and environmental problems often
requires an allocation of burdens, a task that engenders self-serving
"egocentric interpretations of fairness," that inhibit agreements that
must be made before getting to the solutions.125 Cooperation to solve
even the most pressing problems is elusive. Canada's Pacific halibut
fishery provides a case in point. The fishery had become overfished as
early as 1980, giving rise to economist Peter Pearse's prescription of
adopting an individual transferable quota program to curb
overfishing.126 The fishermen themselves recognized the need to adopt
120. Supra, note 27, at 252-65.
121. Supra, note 27, at 262-65.
122. The "endowment effect" is the propensity for people to hold onto that
which they already have, and to value it more than if they had to engage in a
transaction to acquire it. Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980).
123. Legislatures have typically indulged constituents by offering tax incentives
rather than taxes to curb externality-imposing activities like driving. Maureen B.
Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence¸ 49 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 685, 687-690 (2002).
124. Strahilevitz, supra, note 43, at 1239.
125. Supra, note 27, at 260-62.
126. PETER H. PEARSE, TURNING THE TIDE, A NEW POLICY FOR CANADA'S
PACIFIC FISHERIES, B.C. Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1982. Individual
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an individual transferable quota program, but could not agree on an
initial allocation of the quota.127 Only a sharply-worded ultimatum by
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (who would have jurisdiction
over the program) brought the fishermen back to the bargaining table,
from which they eventually emerged with an agreement on how to
allocate the quota.128
The human propensity to blame also plays into this pathology
and plays a role in preventing cooperation from taking place. Fishing
industries and fishing communities have trouble refraining from
overfishing and have trouble agreeing to a cooperative solution
because they remain fixated on the role that others have had in
contributing the problem.129 Even if cooperation and sacrifice are in
the best interests of the resource users, it has often proven to be too
galling to undertake if they harbor a perception, right or not, that
someone else's behavior was to blame for the problem in the first
place.130
Finally, resource users deal with scientific uncertainty in ways
that are not conducive to conservation or co-operation. People tend to
adopt the most optimistic projections of resource stocks.131 People
assume that they will find a way to make things work out, or that there
will ultimately be some sort of government bailout.132 In the case of
fishermen, regulation is often resisted because they cherish the
opportunity to compete against each other,133 many of them because
they harbor an elevated perception of the fishing skills vis-à-vis other
fishermen.134 In short, uncertainty is almost never resolved in such a
way that invites co-operation or regulation.

quota programs regulate fishing by licensing fishing to a specified quantity per
quota. The quantity-based license cures the incentive to overfish in order to
maximize profits, and the transferability provides an incentive for less efficient
fishermen to exit the fishery, alleviating the overcapitalization problem. See, e.g.,
Shi-Ling Hsu & James Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable
Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 801-03 (1997).
127. SUZANNE IUDICELLO, FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS
OF OVERFISHING 149 (1999).
128. Id.
129. Supra, note 27, at 261.
130. Supra, note 27, at 261-62.
131. Supra, note 27, at 262-65.
132. Id.
133. Supra, note 27, at 244-45.
134. Supra, note 27, at 244.
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All of these propensities are, in some sense, pathological. But
for even the casual observer of human nature, these explanations of
why people ignore their own long-term interests ring remarkably true.
People very often very strongly prefer the broken system they know to
the quite possibly superior system they do not know, even if they
recognize that they are trapped in a tragic spiral.
Campaign finance and spending reform have been hostage to
the same fears of the unknown. Opposition to the BCRA came from
the AFL-CIO,135 the American Civil Liberties Union, the National
Right to Life Committee, the Christian Coalition, the American Heart
Association, and various chambers of commerce, to name just a few of
the strange bedfellows.136 Congressional campaigners, presumably the
beneficiaries of regulation that would limit the amount of fundraising
they would have to do, have themselves been extremely critical of
election financing.137 Rep. Albert R. Wynn (D-MD), an AfricanAmerican, opposed the BCRA because he believed that the soft money
ban would impair the ability of black candidates and elected black
representatives to fund get-out-the-vote drives and voter registration
activities;138 this, despite the obvious reality that the overwhelming
majority of soft money is contributed by regulated industries to further
their economic interests, and confer substantially more advantages to
white candidates than black.139 On the other side of the aisle,
Republicans opposed the bill because of its lack of prohibitions on
labor union activity in soliciting soft money for party activities;140 this
despite the widely-held belief that a ban on soft money would amplify
their advantage in hard money donations over the Democrats.141 At
every turn, opposition to the BCRA has come from those with worstcase suspicions of how the legislation would work to their detriment.

135. William O'Rourke, Editorial: Grieving Democrats Quietly Fade Into
Insignificance, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, March 27, 2001, at 33.
136. Vanessa Blum, Senate Showdown: Battle Shifts on Finance Reform, LEGAL
TIMES, March 19, 2001 at 1.
137. PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME
AND IN WASHINGTON 284 (2004).
138. American Political Network: the Hotline, Vol. 10, No. 9, National Briefing
Campaign Finance Reform: Does CBC Hold Keys in the House? April 9, 2001.
139. Herrnson, supra, note 137, at __.
140. Robert Braile, Of Politics and Money: a Man Recalls the Promise of a
Handshake, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 1996, at 1.
141. Thomas Edsall, Campaign-reform Law Favors Republican Fund-raising
Style, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, February 8, 2004, at 5.
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And yet, some have recognized the need for mutual coercion.
Former Senator Zell Miller wrote in an op-ed about his support for the
BCRA:
Make no mistake about it: When it comes to winning
political races by raising millions of dollars and buying
lots of TV time, I'm as competitive as they come. I've
done it three times in a row now – once for the Senate
and twice for governor – and it's the formula for
success in politics today. But frankly, it's a rotten
formula, and the rules of this game need to change.…
Yes, I know how to play that fundraising game with the
best of them. Only today, I don't sleep nearly as well as
I did years ago in those cheap motel rooms or on
supporters' sofas.142
Implicit in Miller's op-ed is the recognition that, on some level, he
enjoys the competitive aspect of raising and spending money. Like
fishermen, politicians do not like to admit, publicly or to themselves,
that they would like to be restrained from competing against each
other in a game of skill, energy, and aggression, even if it detracts
from the more important business of legislating and governing.
Politicians labor under the same self-serving and self-congratulatory
myths that fishermen do. And yet, at the end of the day, both
politicians and fishermen understand on some level that the rat race
just gets worse and worse.
In the end, of course, the BCRA passed both the House and
Senate and the President signed it into law on March 27, 2002. In
some ways, it was surprising that it took as much effort to pass it as it
did – clearly the public perceived that campaign spending, especially
that procured from soft money – was a corrupting influence.143
Campaign finance reform generally receives strong public support,144
and the BCRA, as a flashpoint for the issue, enjoyed particularly

142. Zell Miller, A Sorry Way to Win, WASH. POST, February 25, 2001, at B7.
143. Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, Perception of Corruption and
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 3, 13-14,
19-25, unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania Law School, available
online at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=upenn/wps.
144. Id., at 13.
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strong support.145 Even if Congressional opponents of BCRA really
believed that this would not ultimately solve the problem of tainted
soft money, why would they be so reluctant to adopt something their
constituents so strongly favor?
VI.

Solving Tragedies of the Commons Problems

What, then, is to be done about these true tragedies of the
commons that are at the heart of Hardin's contribution? What we have
learned from the fishing problem is that it is very difficult to control
the overexploitive behavior without addressing the incentives to race.
Fishing regulations governing the use of destructive fishing
technologies have been fraught with enforcement problems or been
met with technological substitutions that have foiled the conservation
purposes behind the regulations. For example, restrictions on boat
lengths were met with the entry of rounder and more powerful
boats,146 while regulations on line lengths were met with lines with
more hooks.147 Regulations requiring fishing nets to be of a minimum
mesh size (to allow small fish to escape) were met with the practice of
intertwining nets to reduce the mesh size.148 Seasonal restrictions have
only increased the pressure to engage in a short but increasingly
intense fishing season. The Alaskan halibut fishery was reduced to a
two-day season composed of two 24-hour fishing seasons, and the
Canadian Pacific halibut fishery was reduced to a six-day season.
These absurdly short seasons were simply derbies in which fishermen
caught as much halibut as possible, paying no regard to ecological
waste or human safety.149 The problem is that none of these solutions
145. Public opinion polls vary in quality and results, but almost all every stage
showed support for the McCain-Feingold legislation. The advocacy group Public
Campaign commissioned a reputable polling group, the Mellman Group, to conduct
eight statewide polls on support for the bill, and found support ranging from 58 to 75
percent in favor. http://www.commondreams.org/pressreleases/jan99/011999e.htm
(last visited January 31, 2005).
146. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL
POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 175-76 (1999).
147. IUDICELLO, supra, note 127, at 81.
148. IUDICELLO, supra, note 127, at 81.
149. In derby fisheries such as the Canadian Pacific halibut fishery and the
Alaskan halibut fishery before the advent of quotas systems, fishermen routinely
worked around the clock, elevating risk of injury, while hauling in massive
quantities of bycatch – fish species other than halibut incidentally caught – and
wastefully discarding them. Derby fishing also leaves behind a trail of discarded
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change the incentive to cheat. Making it more difficult to fish does not
change the fundamental tragedy of the commons dynamics – the race
to overexploit a rivalrous resource, and grab as much as possible while
the resource still exists. Indeed, many of these regulatory courses
exacerbate the incentives to cheat, overfish, and engage in a race to do
so. Of course, sometimes a property rights-based solution is also
unworkable – enforcement and monitoring problems must be solved
no matter what the regulatory regime. But the essential failure of
regulators in addressing tragedies of the commons is the failure to
recognize and address the incentives to race to exploit a finite resource
that is rivalrous in consumption.
Like Ackerman and Ayres, I applaud the BCRA because it
attempts the difficult task of trying to control excessive campaign
behavior rather than throwing up one's hands and declaring defeat.150
And the Ackerman and Ayres proposal, a public financing proposal
that confers, rather than detracts from fundamental liberties is a salve
that could buy some valuable time in terms of removing the taint of
campaign money, making political speech more temporarily more
credible. But in the end, neither of these schemes addresses the
incentives of politicians to race to raise money, to try and best one
another even in a game that is "disgusting, degrading, and
demeaning." In the end, neither would save the voting public from a
world congested with campaign speech. Even "clean" money, if it
buys too much speech, will dull the voters' overloaded senses. If in
fact, we are witnessing a tragedy of the commons in campaign
spending, then arresting it will require more than the BCRA and more
than what Ackerman and Ayres propose. It will require limitations on
the quantity of campaign spending.
The argument that we might regulate campaign speech is not a
radical or new one. Cass Sunstein argued in Democracy and the
Problem of Free Speech that the distinction between campaign
contributions and campaign expenditures has turned out to be
somewhat illusory.151 Moreover, because of the rise of political action
committees, the limit on contributions has actually exacerbated some
of the problems of corruption and taint that the limit was meant to
hooks, lines and nets that continue to "ghost fish" by snarling fish outside of any
fishing effort at all. IUDICELLO, supra, note 127, at 136-37; Charles Birkeland,
Ratcheting Down the Coral Reefs, 54 BIOSCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2004).
150. Ackerman and Ayres, supra, note 106, at 177-78.
151. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 94101 (1995).
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solve.152 Indeed, Sunstein argues that these scheme of half-hearted
regulation is no less a regulatory system than one that might involve
considerably more government involvement, and that replacing it is
not necessarily unconstitutional.153 More generally, there are those that
are concerned with economic power being perpetuated or even
amplified by means of protecting free speech rights that, as a practical
matter, can only be purchased through large sums of money.154 But
while these measures have heretofore been justified on the grounds
that a new balance must be struck, my argument is different. My
argument is that no balancing is necessary, as intervention could be
beneficial to those that would be regulated.
Exactly what form of campaign expenditure limits might be
needed to truly solve the tragedy of the commons in campaign finance
and spending problem is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it
say, however, curtailing the incentives to race and overadvertise would
almost certainly involve curtailing the quantity of direct appeals from
political candidates through controlling their spending. The
overabundance of campaign speech, after all, is what causes us voters
to tune out. Perhaps this must be coupled with some form of public
financing, as many have suggested,155 to ensure that we are still
attempting to enhance speech and not merely quash it. But limiting
candidate access to the public merits a serious discussion when we
already tolerate a number of abridgements, including those set out in
the BCRA.
Several U.S. states have enacted various forms of spending and
contribution limits.156 Canada has had federal campaign spending
limitations in effect since 1974. The Election Expenses Act157 imposed
spending limits on parties158 and individual candidates,159 provided

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996).
155. See, e.g., supra, note 79.
156. For a discussion of several of the state initiatives, see Maeghan Maloney
and Michael Saxl, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Unintended Consequences
and the Maine Solution, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGISL. 465 (2004).
157. R.S.C. 1974.
158. Parties may only spend $0.70 for every eligible voter in the district. Canada
Elections Act, c. 9, § 422(1) (S.C. 2000).
159. Candidates may only spend some calculated amount based upon the number
of eligible voters in the district. Canada Elections Act, c. 9, §§ 440, 441(1) (S.C.
2000).
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fairly generous federal subsidies for election expenses,160 and required
broadcasters to make prime time air time available for registered
political parties.161 Interestingly enough, at least one commentator has
attributed the spending limits and electoral reforms to "an agreement
to put an end to the upward spiral of election spending."162 The same
commentator also noted that
when combined with a reasonable level of public
funding, spending limits reduce the pressure for parties
and candidates to raise funds. This should not be
interpreted to mean that parties face no such pressures.
Rather, the pressure to raise money is reduced so that
candidates do not find themselves devoting as
significant a portion of their time to fundraising as do
their American counterparts. By lessening the pressure
to raise funds, spending limits are believed to reduce
the temptation for parties and candidates to offer a
quid-pro-quo for large contributions. Of course, such
unsavory practices do occur from time to time, but the
combination of spending limits and public funding in
all probability reduces the frequency of such
incidents.163
Is Canada such an awful example of electoral politics? The
parliamentary system of government poses different challenges than
does the American system, but surely this experience with spending
limits is not such a failure that it is worth dismissing out of hand.

160. Parties may receive federal reimbursement for up to 50 percent of their
election expenses provided they garner at least two percent of the valid votes case
nationally, or a total of five percent of the valid votes in districts in which they ran
candidates. Canada Elections Act, c. 9, § 435(1) (S.C. 2000). Candidates may
receive up to 50 percent of their election expenses reimbursed provided they receive
a minimum of some calculated percentage of votes. Canada Elections Act, c. 9, §§
464, 465 (S.C. 2000). Finally, political contributions are eligible for a tax credit
worth up to a total credit of $500. Income Tax Act, c. 1, § 248 (R.S.C. 1985).
161. The Canada Elections Act requires radio and TV stations to provide free
prime time air time advertising for registered parties. Canada Elections Act, c. 9, §
345 (S.C. 2000).
162. Lisa Young, Regulating Campaign Finance in Canada: Strengths and
Weaknesses, 3 ELECTION L.J. 444, 447 (2004)
163. Young, supra, note 162, at 450.
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Clearly, problems would remain were spending limitations to
be adopted. The strongest criticism of campaign spending limits seems
to be that any financial prohibitions will only result in like-kind
behavior. Lott has argued that limits on contributions will give rise to
like-kind donations.164 But is this always such a bad thing? Would it
be such a disaster for democracy to have people donating, for
example, their time rather than their money to a political campaign?
One wonders if the distortions caused by attempts to regulate
campaign speech would really be worse than the existing distortions.
VI.

Conclusion

This Article does not set forth a Constitutional justification for
campaign fundraising limits or spending limits. But in the end, if the
Constitutional value that we are protecting when we strike down these
limits is that of freedom of speech, then we must confront threats to
that freedom. This Article is meant to demonstrate that one threat to
that freedom is the excessive exercise of that freedom itself. Wellrecognized intrusions upon the right to speak are based upon a
recognition of competing interests. My proposed curtailment of speech
is motivated by protection of the right to speak itself. While great care
must be taken to design a regulatory scheme and implement rules that
minimize perverse incentives, no balancing of interests is necessary.
It is curious, this dichotomy we draw between speech and
property. Why does the Constitution treat property regulation and
speech regulation differently?165 Is it because we believe property is
scarce and speech is "free"?166 This is clearly not true in an
information-overloaded modern society. I certainly do not advocate
jurisprudentially collapsing speech and property, but it is worth
bearing in mind property lessons as we think about campaign speech
and speech generally. Just as the tragedy of the commons has taught us
that in a property context we sometimes cannot trust people alone to
order their affairs in a sensible way, we should now realize that some
paternalism in the speech context may be necessary as well. Because
political campaign speech is so important to a well-functioning
democracy, it is all the more important that we consider bringing it

164. Supra, note 100, at 362.
165. Overton, supra, note 81, at 1249-58.
166. Overton, supra, note 81, at 1249-58.
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into the regulatory realm, and not be left to chimerical free market
ideals.

